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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum



THE ARAB WORLD, THE USSR,
AND THE WEST

12 MARCH 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: The Arab World, the USSR, and the West

SUMMARY

1. The struggle between the dynamic, politically-appealing, revolution-exporting government of the UAR and the conservative Arab governments which oppose it will continue to be a key factor in the Arab world for some time to come. The cause of socialism and Arab unity possesses, in fact, a universal appeal among the Arabs which touches all the Arab nations and inspires elements in them to strive for dominance. Revolutionary-versus-conservative struggles are going on in one form or another throughout the Arab world. In addition, of course, the revolutionary leaders often quarrel among themselves. The clash of most immediate and urgent concern at the present time is that between the UAR and Saudi Arabia.

2. Regardless of the outcome of the confrontation now taking place in the Yemen between the UAR and Saudi Arabia, conservative regimes seem unlikely over the longer run to prove a match for Nasir and the other revolutionaries. Consequently, barring the use of force majeure, the successes and failures of both East and West in their contest for influence in the Arab world will probably be determined largely by the degree of success they achieve in their dealings with the dynamic, radical forces. In this effort, the Soviet Union and the U.S. seem to stand roughly equal in advantages and disadvantages. Unless one chooses to abandon the field to the other, neither appears likely to gain decisive influence in the area during the next several years, although success of revolutionary movements may result in some erosion of the Western position.

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OCI No. 0505/63

12 March 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: The Arab World, the USSR, and the West

1. The Arab world is presently in a particularly active phase of ferment. Attention is focused on the Yemen, where the UAR is pressing for a confrontation with Saudi Arabia. However, unstable internal situations exist in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan; Libya and Kuwait with their oil wealth and underdeveloped political structures remain tempting prizes for their ambitious neighbors. The Kurdish problem could flare up again, and the Arab-Israeli quarrel is still very much with us. Many of these problems are interrelated, and most of them involve ideological conflicts, personal ambitions, and national and racial interests. All affect Soviet and U.S., as well as Arab, interests.

2. The complexity of the situation in the Arab world makes it very difficult to deal with the area as a whole in any systematic way, and particularly hard to isolate any specific set of factors to use as a basis for longer term analysis. We believe, however, that for some time to come a key factor throughout the Arab area will be the continuing pressure on the conservative, usually Western-oriented, elements by the revolutionary movement initiated by Nasir and now promoted also by such other groups as the Yemeni Republican Government, the new governments dominated by the Baath Party which have come into power in Iraq and Syria, and indigenous opposition elements in almost all the conservative Arab countries. We propose in this memorandum, therefore, to examine briefly the character, capabilities, and intentions of (a) Nasir, (b) the other revolutionaries, and (c) the conservative Arab elements, and to discuss the implications for both the USSR and the West.

Nasir, the Modern Salah-al-Din

3. Of the revolutionaries who have gone to the barricades, Nasir is incontestably the most successful and the most important. While there are strong

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elements of Egyptian expansionism in his policies, he remains, we believe, first and foremost a compulsive "Arab socialist" revolutionary, bent on the overthrow of old political and economic orders and the eradication of foreign influence throughout the Arab world. He feels obliged not only to protect such revolutions as have already occurred but also to encourage and support those local opposition forces which share his objectives and look to him for leadership against their own governments.

4. His unremitting opposition to the existing regimes in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the rimlands of the Arabian Peninsula is based on the conviction that these regimes will not and cannot change, that any reforms they may undertake will be insincere and ineffective, and they will try to oppose and undo the progress he feels he has achieved in the UAR, and that their very existence constitutes a threat to Arab revolutions which have been accomplished elsewhere. Any kind of cooperation or lasting peace with them is simply not in his scheme of things.

5. In pursuing his policy, Nasir is capable of strong and at times even rash action, e.g., his abrupt nationalization of the Suez Canal and, more recently, his prompt intervention in the Yemen, his commitment of a large proportion of his armed forces there, and his growing truculence toward Saudi Arabia. At the same time he has--particularly when confronted with strong opposition and threatened with failure--demonstrated a capacity for restraint, as exemplified by his handling of the Syrian breakaway from the UAR, the caution he is exercising in his attempts to influence the new revolutionary regimes in Iraq and Syria, and his professed willingness to negotiate withdrawal of forces from the Yemen when he is sure of the security of the republican government there. This last may prove the greatest test thus far both of his ability as an Arab leader and of his capacity for restraint in critical situations.

6. The same characteristics are evident in his dealings with the Great Powers. He defies the USSR by suppressing local communists, and the U.S. by his subversive and disruptive activities against all the other Middle East governments--particularly Saudi Arabia and Jordan. His radio stations regularly attack the West and occasionally even the USSR. Yet on

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matters relating to the Soviet military aid program and the supplying by the U.S. of large quantities of surplus food, he will go to considerable effort to cooperate with his patrons. In general, his past experience with the Great Powers has led him to believe that he can accept much from both sides while giving little in return. Indeed, his main objective almost certainly remains to hold to a minimum the influence of both East and West in the Arab world. As he presently sees the situation, this probably implies a further reduction of Western influence from its present level and prevention of any significant expansion of the Soviet presence which has developed over the past several years.

7. We believe Nasir's future policy and actions will be characterized by the same highly individual mixture of revolutionary fervor, personal ambition, pragmatism, and independence that he has demonstrated in the past. He will continue to encourage revolution wherever it has not taken place in the Arab world, and even where it has, if the first results are not to his liking. He will try to extend his influence over other revolutionaries, but if he cannot control them he will probably accept a modus vivendi with them. He will refuse any such relationship with the conservative regimes, exploiting every opportunity to undermine their attempts at reform and to destroy their political power. While trying to avoid a showdown with either the USSR or the West, he will suppress the special positions or organs of influence of both in whatever part of the Arab world he may be able to control. If he comes into conflict with one, he will rely more heavily on the other, but he is unlikely ever to establish a lasting or even moderately trusting relationship with either. This does not imply an exact Soviet-U.S. stand-off in terms of influence during the next few years, since the mutual Soviet-UAR interest in promoting the revolutionary cause will probably tend to erode established Western positions in the area.

Other Revolutionaries

8. However great his personal prominence, Nasir is not, of course, the only revolutionary leader among the Arabs. Qasim, when he came to power in Iraq in 1958, clearly had as much right to

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the title as Nasir. Other revolutionary plotters exist even now in almost every Arab country. Most of them have, like Nasir, vague, generally radical ideas for social and economic change. These home-grown revolutionaries enjoy some support, or at least sympathy, from younger educated military and civilian elements, but their organization tends to be poor and often their only clear objective is that of eliminating the regime in power. Their attitudes toward Nasir vary widely, but most share his opposition to foreign influence and the conservative Arabs, and all see his achievements in Egypt as a model for their own causes. Perhaps most importantly, many of them believe his support is essential to their own success.

9. The various Baathist factions which have been plotting for years in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq have some advantage over other revolutionaries deriving from their relatively well developed ideology, worked out by such political thinkers as Salah al-Din al Bitar, Michel Aflaq, and Akram al-Hawrani, and from the "all-Arab" character of their party. Indeed, the Baathist success in overthrowing Qasim on 8 February 1963 and in gaining control of the new Iraqi Government, together with the major role it is playing in the new Syrian revolutionary government set up 8 March 1963, clearly add a new dimension to the Arab revolution. The Baath Party's goals are not far different from Nasir's; their socialism is at best only a little less militant, their suspicion of all foreign influence and their hostility toward the conservative Arabs equally strong. However, for the first time now, local Arab revolutionaries can with some hope of success work for a positive objective without taking direction from Cairo or even having to rely on its support.

10. Within Iraq, the course that the new regime intends to pursue is not yet clear. The widespread dislike of Qasim and aversion to the years of insecurity and uncertainty under him give the Baath government an opportunity to create a "national" administration with broad popular support. However, the coup leaders are primarily a group of clandestine plotters with virtually no administrative or political experience to draw upon. They face many knotty problems. Not the least of these, in view of their

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strong emphasis on Arabism as a political concept, will be the establishment of a working relationship with the Kurds. If, flushed with success, they try to ram through their own particular formula for progress and development, serious dissatisfaction could develop quickly.

11. The situation in Syria is probably even more unstable. The Baath dominates the civilian government, but the base of power will continue to lie with the highly factionalized Syrian military within which there are probably still some elements who would like to see reunion with Egypt. The large Syrian Communist Party remains potentially dangerous. Under these circumstances, further political convulsions of one kind or another seem virtually inevitable.

12. The Syrian and Iraqi Baathists face similar problems in the context of the Arab world as a whole. Their success in establishing themselves in Damascus and Baghdad will almost certainly give a fillip to the revolutionary cause in general. However, this could be rapidly dissipated by further intra-Arab strife such as developed between Nasir and Qasim. At best, the working out of a mutually acceptable modus vivendi with Nasir will be difficult, and there are many circumstances in which a clash could occur--perhaps most notably in Syria, where internal political quarrels are bitter and deep-seated and where both Cairo and Baghdad have long had conflicting ambitions.


Conservative Elements

13. Circumstances have not been such as to bring about serious quarrels between Nasir and some conservative regimes such as Libya and Kuwait. On the other hand his hostility toward Jordan and Saudi Arabi is implacable, and their opposition to him is of the same nature. Both Crown Prince Faysal and King Husayn, being hereditary leaders, tend to look upon their countries as personal and family responsibilities and to identify the national futures with their own. The policies and objectives of the Baath may be just as inimical to their interests as those of Nasir, but they realize that for the period immediately ahead, at least, their enemy is Nasir, and they tend to see the battle with him as one in which there can be no compromise.

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14. Faysal, and especially Husayn, have demonstrated themselves capable of some modernization, but they have little confidence in such popular political institutions as do exist in their countries.




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the longer run the conservative regimes seem unlikely to prove a match for Nasir and the other revolutionaries. It is true that the conservative regimes' efforts at modernization might make more headway if it were not for Nasir's constant propaganda and subversion against them

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this to some degree. The aggressive manner in which he has been mounting his campaign against Faysal suggests that he may think the U.S. is now prepared to put up with broader and more violent attacks on Western interests than has been the case in the past. At the same time he remains intensely suspicious of any effort by the U.S. to influence his behavior, and he and most other revolutionaries would almost certainly interpret any major new U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia as proof that the West remains wedded to its traditional Arab allies and fundamentally hostile to Arab revolutionary movements.

17. This situation in which the U.S. may find itself "damned if it does and damned if it doesn't" is obviously to the taste of the USSR, and Moscow has sought to exploit it by identifying itself with the revolutionary cause while trying to portray the U.S. as the ally of reaction. The Soviet image has probably been generally improved among Arab revolutionaries by the USSR's unequivocal support of the republican cause in the Yemen, and certainly Soviet military and economic aid has enabled all the revolutionary regimes to be more intransigent in their dealings with the West on a wide range of issues. In addition, of course, the USSR has long enjoyed a unique advantage from its ability to support the Arab cause against Israel--perhaps the one issue on which all Arabs can unite.


18. At the same time, the USSR too is finding it impossible to stay clear of the many crossfires which make the exercise of real influence in the Arab world by foreigners so difficult. Whatever success the Soviet Union may have had in identifying itself with the anti-conservative "Arab nationalist" cause, local jealousies and conflicts have made it impossible for it to organize or exploit a unified revolutionary movement. Individual revolutionary leaders have resisted direct Soviet control and indigenous Communist movements just as vigorously as the most conservative regimes, and have been generally equally adamant in refusing to abandon such ties with the West as they felt served their overall interests. However inured Moscow may have become to Nasir's intractability, it could hardly have been other than disconcerted by the violent anti-Communist character which the Baath revolution in Iraq has assumed, and by the inability of the

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relatively strong Syrian Communist Party to influence significantly developments in Damascus.

19. This is not to suggest that the USSR has by any means exhausted the possibilities for mis-chief-making--or indeed for the expansion of its influence--in the Arab world. For one thing, it has a still-untried, and potentially very dangerous, additional string to its bow, i.e., the alternative of going over to a tough policy of demanding a more direct payoff for its aid from such countries as the UAR and Iraq which are heavily dependent on this aid, and perhaps also of giving more direct and vigorous support to local Communist elements. Even within the context of present Soviet policy there will almost certainly be attractive opportunities ahead. To give only two examples: the emergence of an anti-Communist Baathist regime in Baghdad may have further undercut Soviet ambitions for a special position with Arab revolutionary movements in general, but it has also lifted the main inhibition to Soviet support for Kurdish autonomy, a cause which holds considerable danger for such Western-allied countries as Iran and Turkey



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20. On balance, however, we believe that the decisive issues in the Arab world in the years ahead will be indigenous rather than international ones, not the least the struggle between conservative and revolutionary elements discussed above. Barring frequent and clear-cut use of force majeure, it seems likely that the successes and failures of both East and West in the struggle for influence will be determined largely by the degree to which they are able to find common interests with the most dynamic and successful local forces in a shifting and unstable situation. In this effort, the USSR and the US seem to stand roughly equal in advantages and disadvantages, and unless one chooses to abandon the field to the other, neither appears likely to be able to gain decisive influence in the area. The question of influence aside, however, the Western position in general may possibly suffer some erosion because of economic factors attached to revolutionary activity.

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Annex A

EGYPT (UAR)

1. General: Egypt is by far the most populous of the Arab states, with a total population of about 27.5 million and a high annual growth rate of nearly 3%. Density is 71 persons per square mile, but the large majority inhabit the narrow strip paralleling the Nile River. Only about 3% of the area of 386,000 square miles is cultivable. The population is 90% Arab Muslim; minorities are insignificant. Only 30% are literate.

2. Government: Egypt is nominally a republic, but President Gamal Abd al-Nasir and a small coterie of former military officers have made and executed policy since the revolution of 1952 upsetting the monarchy. The present cabinet--Executive Committee--was handpicked by Nasir from among his military colleagues and includes some technicians. Western style political parties do not exist. A new monolithic party--Arab Socialist Union--is being formed under government supervision, and parliamentary elections, with representation determined on an occupational basis, are scheduled for this year. Political stability has been maintained by Nasir's general popularity both with civilians and the armed forces. He is also backed by a large and efficient internal security force. Egyptian Communists are thoroughly suppressed and there are no other organized anti-regime elements with a significant potential.

3. Economic: Egypt is basically an agricultural country and its main crop--cotton--accounts for about 70% of foreign exchange earnings. There is a consistently unfavorable balance of trade, the major import items being food grains, capital goods, and petroleum products. Since 1957, the Communist bloc has taken about 60% of the cotton exported. Completion of the Aswan High Dam in the late 1960's will increase arable land by a million acres, but this increase is likely to be offset by population growth. The Nasir regime hopes to make the country economically viable by increasing the industrial contribution--25% last year--to the GNP. Its socialist policies, however, have discouraged foreign investment, and its development plans had to be cut

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back because of a severe foreign exchange shortage. Textiles and food processing are the major industries. The GNP for 1961 was US \$3.5 billion, about \$131 per capita.

4. Military forces: The Egyptian army, a conscript force numbering approximately 6,000 officers and 94,000 enlisted men, is the largest Arab army. Mobilization to an estimated maximum strength of 190,000 would require six months. Equipment and materiel are almost entirely from the Soviet bloc, and Soviet doctrine and organization are used. The Egyptian air force of about 4,500 men is equipped with an estimate 211 jet fighters, including 45 MIG-21's with air-to-air missiles, and 46 jet-light (IL-28) and 20 medium (TU-16) bombers. Personnel of the navy is estimated at about 7,500, with 6 destroyers--4 ex-Soviet and 2 ex-British--10 ex-Soviet submarines, 3 Komar class guided missile boats, 6 ex-British patrol escorts, 18-27 ex-Soviet motor torpedo boats, several minesweepers, and lesser craft. The USSR is installing the first of an undisclosed number of surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and training of Egyptian operating personnel is underway. Egypt is developing a surface-to-surface missile capability with private foreign assistance, mostly West German. A few 200-mile rockets with a 500-pound payload might be deployed by mid-1964.

5. Communist bloc relations: The extremely close relations with the Soviet bloc that developed following the Suez crisis in 1956 were badly strained in 1958-59 when Nasir and Khrushchev clashed over Nasir's opposition to Arab Communists. They have also differed over Syria's secession from the UAR and bloc support for Qasim of Iraq. Government-to-government relations recently have been correct and occasionally cordial while their respective propaganda organs exchange sporadic "unofficial" recriminations. Nasir remains entirely dependent on the USSR for military weapons and supplies, and the prestige of both is deeply involved in the Aswan Dam undertaking. Egypt has received over \$700 million worth of bloc arms and about \$600 million in economic aid credits. Egyptian relations with Communist China--established in 1956--are cool, with Egypt overtly critical of Peiping's policy toward India.

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6. Relations with the US: US-Egyptian relations have improved steadily in recent years, although US support for Israel and what Nasir calls the "reactionary" regimes in Jordan and Saudi Arabia remains a serious source of friction. Egypt is heavily dependent on large grants of US PL-480 wheat and is relying on US and other Western economic aid to underwrite its industrial development schemes. US economic assistance, not including PL-480, has exceeded \$500 million since 1958.

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Annex B

SYRIA

1. General: Syria is one of the few Arab countries with more than adequate land for its population. With only 4,750,000 inhabitants--annual growth rate is about 2 percent--population density is 66 per square mile. Twenty-five percent of the land is cultivable and 32 percent is adequate pasture land. The country is 87 percent Muslim, including about 150,000 Kurds and 100,000 Druze, and 13 percent are Christian, including about 120,000 Armenians.

2. Government: The military coup of 8 March 1963 resulted in a civilian cabinet dominated by members of the pan-Arab socialist (Baath) party. Its stability is highly uncertain and the issue of the policy to be followed toward Egypt's Nasir will continue to be the major problem. The lineup of factions in the armed forces remains unclear, although there is known to be a sizable pro-Nasirist element. Communist party members are being rounded up, and there are no other appreciable dissident elements.

3. Economic: The Syrian economy is predominantly agricultural, with industrial production limited largely to textiles and cement. Cotton, wheat, and barley are the major export crops, mostly going to the West. The total of all Syrian exports has failed to cover total imports for the past several years. The outlook for increased crop production through irrigation is good. For expanded water resources, the government is counting on the completion within several years of a large dam on the Euphrates river, financed largely with West German assistance. Syria's GNP for 1961 was \$805 million, about \$171 per capita.

4. Military forces: The Syrian army, which numbers approximately 4,000 officers and 56,000 enlisted men, is the dominant force on the political scene. Mobilization to a top strength of 96,800 would require 6 months. The army is approximately 85-90 percent equipped with Soviet Bloc arms, mostly of World War II design but including some modern types. Soviet doctrine and organization are used. The Syrian air force of about 3,000 men has an estimated 48 MIG-15 and MIG-17 jet fighters and 2 IL-28 jet light bombers. Its air capabilities, both defensive

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and offensive, are poor. The 1,000-man navy has a few small ex-French and ex-Soviet vessels and has no significant combat capability.

5. Relations with the Communist bloc: The new Syrian government probably will be cautious in its dealings with the Communist bloc and try to remain nonaligned. It will, however, remain dependent on the USSR for military aid. Soviet bloc aid to former Syrian governments totaled \$200-250 million in the military category and \$193 million in the economic.

6. Relations with the US: Syria's relations with the US have varied from poor to bad during the past 15 years. They reached their low point in 1957 following Syrian charges of a US-supported coup attempt. This accusation was taken to the United Nations. The new Baathist prime minister and foreign minister, Salah al-Din Bitar, was foreign minister at the time. Since the Syrian breakaway from Egypt in September 1961, US relations have varied with changes in the internal political situation. There has been much suspicion--even in high government quarters--that the US has picked Nasir as its "chosen instrument" in the Middle East. This resulted in unsubstantiated charges of US interference in internal affairs. Because of the long history of distrust of the US, our relations with the new regime are likely to be difficult.

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Annex C

IRAQ

1. General: Iraq, which has a land area of 170,000 square miles, a population only slightly over 7,000,000, near self-sufficiency in food production and substantial oil resources, has the potential to become prosperous. Ninety-five percent of the population is of the Moslem religion but roughly half of this is the Shiah sect and the other half the Sunni sect. The Kurdish minority constitutes 18 percent of the population and is concentrated in the northern part of the country near the Soviet state of Azerbaijan. They are presently pressing for a semi-autonomous state.

2. Political: The coup on 8 February came after four and a half years of bungling rule by Qasim, who strained the government's relationship with the Western oil companies, brought Iraq close to economic chaos, and pursued a policy of dangerously close relations with the Soviet Union. The present government is dominated by the Iraqi Baath party which planned and carried out the coup. The President and the Prime Minister are largely figureheads; the most important leader in the cabinet is Deputy Prime Minister Sadi who is secretary-general of the Iraqi Baath party. The new government does not have a broad base of popular support. Most of the Baathist leaders, including those in the cabinet, are young and inexperienced in administration. An extensive crack-down has blunted any short-run threat from the Iraqi Communist party, but there are indications of anti-regime sentiment on the part of some nationalist elements.

3. Economic: Iraqi's most important export is oil, which provides the government with an annual revenue of some \$275,000,000. In the pre-Qasim years, substantial amounts of this revenue were set aside in a development fund, but Qasim managed to run through the fund without significantly improving the Iraqi economy. Consumer goods, industries and agriculture account for most activity; the Iraqi date crop is still the source of significant, though declining, exports. Under Qasim, Iraq's trade with the Soviet bloc expanded considerably, but the bulk of it is still with the West. Iraq's gross national product in 1961 was about \$1.4 billion or \$192 per capita.

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4. Military: The Iraqi army has a strength of about 70,000 organized into four infantry and one armored division. A specialized component of the army is the Iraqi River Force, which has some twenty-five vessels, sub-chaser or smaller, based at the Persian Gulf port of Basra. The Iraqi air force has 89 jet fighters, including 10 MIG-21s. The bomber force consists of 10 TU-16 medium jet bombers, 14 IL-28 light jet bombers and 30 piston fighter-bombers. The USSR, during Qasim's regime installed a training site for surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and contracted to supply the missiles later for air defense of Baghdad.

5. Relations with the Soviet bloc: The first order of business for the new Baathist-dominated Iraqi government has been to smash the Iraqi Communist party, which had become strong enough to constitute a serious security threat. Top Communist leaders have been arrested and executed, many others have been jailed, and still others have been killed or beaten in the streets by over-enthusiastic nationalists who were determined on vengeance for past grievances. All this has caused a severe strain in Iraq's relations with Soviet bloc countries, and clandestine radios in the bloc have been urging the Kurds, as well as other groups in Iraq, to rise against the Baathist government. Baghdad hopes, nonetheless, to hold on to many of its agreements for military and economic aid from the Soviet Union and, at the same time, to encourage an increase in aid from the West.

6. Relations with the West: The new Iraqi government has moved quickly to normalize relations with the West. The Minister for Oil Affairs has indicated a much more reasonable attitude toward dealings with the Western oil companies. A step forward has been achieved in negotiations with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, and the new regime is being more practical in its policy toward Kuwait, which Qasim had threatened to seize. The general Iraqi foreign policy line is one of positive neutrality, however, and as one of the "liberated" Arab governments, Iraq is aligned against the conservative governments of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as against Israel.

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Annex D

JORDAN

1. General: Jordan is an Indiana-sized country, 84 percent desert, and about 10 percent cultivable. Its population of 1,700,000 includes about 630,000 troublesome Palestinian refugees and is about 88 percent Muslim and 12 percent Christian.

2. Government: King Husayn rules as a constitutional monarch and with a cabinet responsible to a bicameral parliament, but his appointive powers and the support of the bedouin-dominated army make his ultimate authority practically absolute. Political parties have been suppressed since an abortive coup attempt by pro-Nasir elements in 1957. Election of the present parliament last year was relatively free from government control, and a small opposition group gained membership. The present prime minister, Wasfi Tal, has alienated some special interest groups in Jordan by his modest reforms but he still enjoys the support of the king. Pro-Nasirist and radical Arab nationalist groups--largely among the Palestinians--represent a dangerous subversive threat, especially following the recent events in Syria and Iraq. The Communist party and front groups are suppressed. There is some disaffection in the army.

3. Economic: Jordan is one of the poorest of the Arab countries. Its economy is non-viable and the government depends upon U.S. and U.K. grants and assistance to keep going. Depending on the amount of rainfall, the country sometimes is self-sufficient in cereals, but must import many of its other food needs. Industry is limited, and the country imports petroleum products, textiles, capital goods, and other industrial products. The Jordanian government receives an average annual payment of \$3 to \$4 million from the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company. The GNP for 1961 was \$275 million, about \$158 per capita.

4. Military forces: The total strength of the Jordanian army is 37,400, equipped from western sources. It is believed incapable of any sustained

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offensive combat, and probably could not defend West Jordan against an Israeli attack for more than a few days. About 14,000 regulars and 9,000 lightly armed National Guardsmen defend the Jordan-Israel border. There are about 1,500 men in the Jordanian air force. Following the defections to Egypt of the Jordanian air force commander and two Hawker Hunter pilots with their jet aircraft, Jordan now has 21 Hawker Hunters and 8 Vampire jet fighters. They have virtually no combat capability.

5. Relations with the Communist bloc: Jordan has no diplomatic relations with Communist countries, with the exception of Yugoslavia. Jordanian trade with the bloc is insignificant, although Husayn has indicated an interest in increased economic relations.

6. Relations with the U.S.: U.S.-Jordanian relations have been consistently friendly. King Husayn has shown understanding of the U.S. position on Israel. He has, however, shown considerable irritation with U.S. policy toward Nasir and considers U.S. assistance to Egypt as underwriting Nasir's aggressive adventures in the Arab world. The U.S. has extended a total of \$325.9 million in economic aid to Jordan through 30 June 1962, plus \$24.3 million in military assistance.

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
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Annex E

SAUDI ARABIA

1. General: Saudi Arabia's 865,000 square miles are mostly desert; only one-tenth of one percent of the land is arable. No accurate figure exists on the size of the Saudi population: the best estimate is about 4,500,000. An extremely backward country in which the tribal structure remains of considerable significance, Saudi Arabia continued the institution of slavery until very recent months. No more than five percent of the population is literate.

2. Political: The government is an absolute monarchy. King Saud, still nominal ruler, is in poor health and out of the country for prolonged medical treatment. Crown Prince Faysal has assumed power



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3. Economic: Saudi Arabia is the second largest oil exporter in the Middle East with exports presently running at a rate of more than 1,500,000 barrels per day. Saudi oil revenues for 1962 were roughly \$380,000,000. Little in the way of other economic development has yet been achieved. There is some subsistence agriculture, but much of the food supply has to be imported.



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4. Military: Partly as a protective device for the royal family, Saudi Arabia has two armies. The regular army has a strength of 14,850, is badly equipped, poorly disciplined and generally ineffective.

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5. Relations with Soviet bloc: The Saudi regime, starkly anti-Communist and suspicious of all things connected with Communism, has no diplomatic relations or trade agreements with bloc countries. Occasionally, Saudi officials have attempted to exert leverage on the United States embassy by threatening to turn to the establishment of ties with the bloc.

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Annex F

YEMEN

1. General: Yemen, with a land area of 50,000 to 75,000 square miles (most of its border area undefined) and a population of 3,000,000-4,000,000, is one of the most backward countries of the world. The country has a substantial area of rich farm land as well as a mountainous and a desert region. Its literacy rate is extremely low, there is no significant industry, and sanitation and public health conditions are primitive. Oil exploration has been unsuccessful.

2. Political: Until the revolt last September, Yemen was ruled by an archaic absolute Imamate. Imam Ahmad, whose death and the consequent succession of the relatively weak Crown Prince Badr made the revolt possible, ruled with a hand of iron. Under his regime the price of dissidence was often death. He kept the tribes under control by taking sons of tribal leaders as hostages. He successfully opposed almost all forms of progress. The new Yemeni government, headed by President Sallal, is a typical Arab revolutionary government giving lip service to the Nasirist doctrines of socialism and Arab unity. There is reason to believe, however, that this regime would take a quasi-independent line from that of the UAR if it did not require Egyptian forces to stay in power. The Sallal regime's base of support is necessarily narrow, since the number of politically conscious elements is relatively small and since some of them are anti-Egyptian Yemeni nationalists.

3. Economy: Yemen is largely self-sufficient in foodstuffs, but has almost no industry. Small amounts of coffee, cotton and hides are exported. One of the more interesting Yemeni agricultural products is the qat leaf, a mild narcotic, which is chewed by a significant part of the population. Yemeni imports include textiles, kerosene, tobacco and other staples. Yemeni GNP in 1961 was estimated at \$360 million or \$90 per capita.

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4. Military: The Yemeni army has changed radically since the revolt. During the early months of fighting, large numbers of army personnel deserted and slipped back to their home tribal sectors. What remained was augmented by the recruitment of some other tribal groups into a "national guard." At present the total Yemeni ground forces are estimated to be less than 10,000 and can be used effectively only for garrison duty or in support of Egyptian units. Egyptian forces consisting of 21,000 combat ground troops and totalling some 28,000 are continuing successful operations against the Yemeni royalists and maintaining the Sallal regime in power.

5. Relations with the Soviet Bloc: Badr, when he was still Crown Prince, was responsible for developing the initial ties between Yemen, the Soviet bloc and Communist China. So far this has proved to be largely a one-way street, with the bloc giving, the Yemen taking. Laborers sent in by Communist China built the present road between the capital of Sana and the major part of Hudaydah. Soviet technicians improved the Hudaydah port facility and certain of the airfields, and, while the Imamate was still in power, the USSR sent in a substantial amount of military equipment, most of which was allowed to rust or deteriorate. Following the coup and during the six months of ensuing fighting in Yemen, the Soviets have provided specialized assistance to Cairo in support of the Egyptian military effort in Yemen and have also sent as a direct gift to the Yemeni government a shipload of military equipment. This included some 30 T-34 tanks as well as a few artillery rocket-launchers. Cairo, while approving of such Soviet assistance to the Yemen, is aiding the Yemeni government to prevent local Communists from gaining ground.

6. Relations with the West: The Sallal regime has been pursuing a neutralist policy, identifying itself with the "liberated" Arab countries of Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, and Syria. Relations with the US have been correct and reasonably cordial since recognition was granted in December, 1962. They have been strained and may become more so, however,

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as a result of Sallal's threatening speeches about the Saudi regime. Sallal's threats to Aden protectorate and colony have contributed to the coolness between Britain and the new Yemeni regime.

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